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INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1988, the five-word sentence most feared by nonexclu-
sive patent licensees was “Your licensor filed for bankruptcy.” They
should still be afraid. While most patentees1 prefer nonexclusive li-
censes,2 which provide enormous royalty profits3 as well as the con-
1. Patent owners.
2. See Stuart P. Meyer, Exploiting Intellectual Property Assets Through Licensing: Strate-
gic Considerations, in PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: HOW TO VALUE,
MAXIMIZE AND ENHANCE YOUR ASSETS 29, 34 (PLI Patents Series No. 468, 1997) (noting that
“the most common type of license is a non-exclusive license”).
3. For example, in 1994, IBM earned $640 million from patent and technology licensing
agreements. See Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital: Licensing
and Cross-Licensing in Semiconductors and Electronics, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1997, at 8,
14. An active licensing strategy instituted in 1985 by Texas Instruments resulted in cumulative
royalty earnings of over $1.8 billion between 1986 and 1993. See id. at 20. Hoping to “offset
skyrocketing R&D and technology development costs,” Dow Chemical, a company known for
its reluctance to license new technology, recently decided to pursue an active licensing strategy.
David Rotman & Alex Scott, Turning Process Know-How into Profits, CHEMICAL WK., July
23, 1997, at 45, 45. Dow hopes that this licensing business will generate annual revenues of $100
million by the year 2000. See id. Chemical giants Monsanto and DuPont also have begun to re-
consider their aversion to licensing. See id. In fact, DuPont has set a licensing revenue target of
$100 million by the year 2005. See id. Even chemical companies with well-established licensing
programs have decided to increase their emphasis on licensing. See id. at 45-46.  It is relatively
safe to assume that the licenses underlying these royalty streams are nonexclusive since the li-
censor-companies would want to maintain the ability to utilize their licensed technology. See
George E. Frost, General Motors’ Approach to Licensing, in 2 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF
LICENSING 734.663, 734.665 (Marcus B. Finnegan & Robert Goldscheider eds., 1980) (noting
that General Motors employs a nonexclusive licensing strategy because it “simply cannot af-
ford to license away [its] own right to use [its] own invention”).
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tinued ability to use the technology and to control patent litigation,4
patentee bankruptcy can place nonexclusive licensees in a precarious
position. Prior to 1988, if a patentee-licensor filed for bankruptcy un-
der chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code5 and was allowed to reject the
license as an executory contract,6 the licensee could no longer use the
patented technology without infringing the patent.7 This unseemly
state of affairs came to a head in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc.8 In Lubrizol, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit allowed the debtor-licensor, Richmond Metal Finish-
ers, to reject as executory its nonexclusive patent license agreement
with its licensee, Lubrizol Enterprises.9
To prevent other patent licensees from suffering fates similar to
that suffered by Lubrizol,10 Congress enacted the Intellectual Prop-
erty Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 (IPBPA).11 Congress in-
tended the IPBPA to protect the debtor-licensor’s right to rehabili-
tate while affording the patent licensee the right to continue
exploiting12 the patent without threat of infringement.13 The IPBPA
allows the debtor-licensor to reject the license, and all affirmative du-
ties under it, while allowing the patent licensee to retain his right to
use the intellectual property.14 Congress realized that by rejecting the
affirmative duties the debtor-licensor breaches the license agreement;
thus, the IPBPA allows the licensee to enter a general unsecured
4. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (noting that General Motors would require
“far greater royalty potential than is usually available to warrant the risk of being dragged into
[patent infringement] litigation” by exclusive licensees). Nonexclusive licenses allow licensors
to retain control over patent litigation because, unlike exclusive licensees, nonexclusive licen-
sees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement. See discussion infra Part I.C.
5. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1994).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79 (explaining executory contracts and how the
ability to reject them in bankruptcy may benefit the debtor).
7. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2-3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201-02.
8. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
9. See id. at 1046-48.
10. See Intellectual Property Contracts in Bankruptcy: Hearing on H.R. 4657 Before the
Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 11 (1988) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (noting that
the Act is intended to “reverse the impact of cases such as Lubrizol”).
11. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35A),
101(39), 365(n) (1994)).
12. In the context of this Note, the term “exploiting” should not be given its usual pejora-
tive meaning, but instead should be defined as “commercializing to the fullest extent possible.”
13. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 4-5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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claim against the debtor-licensor for breach of contract.15 However,
Congress failed to recognize that if the license involved is a nonexclu-
sive patent license, rejecting the affirmative duty to defend the patent
leaves the patent unprotected. While it may be true that debtor-
licensors are not in a financial position to protect the patent, nonex-
clusive patent licensees do not have standing to protect the patent.16
Since patents derive their value from the ability to exclude others
from using the patented technology, failure to protect a patent can
render the patent—as well as licenses based upon it—worthless.17 As
a result, if the Lubrizol case were decided today, the patent licensee
Lubrizol would still be in a precarious position, unable to defend the
licensed patent.
This Note will offer a solution to extricate nonexclusive patent
licensees from this precarious position. Part I will discuss the preva-
lence of nonexclusive patent licenses and reasons for denying nonex-
clusive licensees standing to sue for patent infringement. Part II will
examine the shortcomings of the IPBPA. Part III will propose the use
of a licensees committee, similar to the Official Creditors Committee,
to oversee the protection of a patent during the pendency of a licen-
sor’s bankruptcy proceeding.
I. PATENT LICENSES
Historically, firms have focused on deriving profits from manu-
facturing plants or investments while neglecting the profit potential
of their intellectual property portfolios.18 Many companies have re-
cently realized, however, that patents are a key to maintaining a
competitive advantage in the marketplace.19 This heightened aware-
ness of intellectual property has resulted in an increased emphasis on
protecting patentable technology.20 Aggressive patenting strategies
15. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207.
16. See discussion infra Part I.C.
17. See James S. Hilboldt, Jr., Key License Clauses, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND
LITIGATION 1992, at 191, 201 (PLI Patents Series No. 334, 1992) (stating that “[f]ailure to
prosecute an infringing third party renders the licensed patent worthless, for the very purpose
of a patent is to permit patent holders and licensees to prevent unauthorized parties from en-
gaging in the patented activity”).
18. See Grindley & Teece, supra note 3, at 8 (“While firms have for decades actively man-
aged their physical and financial assets, until quite recently intellectual property . . . manage-
ment was a backwater.”).
19. See id.
20. See id. at 17 (offering statistics showing that, in the 25-year span from 1969 to 1994,
nearly 8% of the patents granted to the top semiconductor companies were issued in 1994).
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do not come without a price, however, and companies have turned to
patent licensing to recoup these costs.21
A. The Decision to License
The role that patents play within the economy depends upon the
ability of the patent owner to protect her patent against infringers.22
In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit (CAFC) and granted it exclusive jurisdiction over patent ap-
peals.23 Since its creation, the CAFC has improved the predictability
and enforceability of patents while developing a more coherent body
of law.24 Importantly, CAFC decisions have helped overcome earlier
judicial bias against patents as evil monopolies.25 Following the
precedents of the CAFC, district courts have increasingly upheld the
validity of patents.26 Growing confidence that patents would survive
21. See The American Bankruptcy Institute Survey: Hearing on S. 1626, S. 1358, S. 1863,
and S. 2279, Bills Pertaining to Title 11 of the United States Code, the Bankruptcy Code, Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 242-43 (1988) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1626] (statement of John P. McLaughlin, Vice
President, Genentech, Inc.) (noting that Genentech uses patent licensing revenues to finance
research and development efforts).
22. See Jon F. Merz & Nicholas M. Pace, Trends in Patent Litigation: The Apparent Influ-
ence of Strengthened Patents Attributable to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 581 (1994) (noting that increasing the enforceability of
patents raises their value, which in turn creates a “greater motivation to seek patent protec-
tion”).
23. See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25, 25,
38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
24. See Merz & Pace, supra note 22, at 579-80.
25. See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 6.04, at 6-8 to 6-9 (Michael A. Epstein &
Frank L. Politano eds., 2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995) (stating that “[t]he Federal Circuit plainly
disagrees with the anti-monopoly philosophies underlying” previous court opinions); Lawrence
G. Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 5, 9 (1991) (noting that the trail blazed by the Federal Circuit has been followed by the
district courts, with the result that “[d]isparaging references to patents as ‘monopolies’ . . . have
all but disappeared from recent judicial decisions”). In fact, the driving force behind the crea-
tion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was the desire to “stabilize the patent law
by means of centralized review.” Merz & Pace, supra note 22, at 579. This need arose from
variable interpretation of the patent law by the twelve federal circuit courts. See id. For a gen-
eral discussion of the specific changes made to the patent law by the Federal Circuit, see Kas-
triner, supra, at 10-22.
26. See Alexander E. Silverman, Intellectual Property Law and the Venture Capital Proc-
ess, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 157, 161-62 (1990) (stating that “[f]rom 1982 through 1987, the CAFC
upheld 89% of district court decisions finding patents [valid], and reversed or vacated 45% of
district court decisions finding patents [invalid]”); Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM.
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judicial scrutiny prompted more businesses to rely on their intellec-
tual property as core business assets.27 Focusing their creative ener-
gies on their patent portfolios, businesses realized that they could ex-
ploit them in a variety of ways: by practicing28 the patented invention
themselves (vertical integration), by selling the patented invention to
another (assignment), or by allowing another to practice the inven-
tion (licensing).29
Among the various ways to exploit an invention, vertical integra-
tion and assignment lie at opposites ends of the spectrum. The patent
statute grants the patentee “the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States.”30 A patentee is considered to have “vertically inte-
grated” her patent if she not only develops the patented invention
but also exploits it in the marketplace.31 Thus, the vertically inte-
grated patentee makes, uses, offers for sale and sells the patented in-
vention. Vertical integration makes sense if the patentee can produce
and market the invention at least as effectively as anyone else could.32
At the other end of the spectrum, a patentee may use an assignment
to transfer all of her interest in the patent, including the right to ex-
clude others, to a third party.33 A patentee who does not want to ver-
tically integrate, but wants to retain rights to the patent can opt for an
intermediate solution, the patent license. Rather than transfer the
U. L. REV. 1087, 1090-91 (1988) (noting that, since the creation of the CAFC, patent litigants
face an increased likelihood that a court will find the patent at issue to be valid).
27. See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, § 6.04, at 6-8 (stating that “the
decisions of the Federal Circuit on validity and infringement and its economic orientation to
patent issues are leading to increased licensing activity”).
28. In the context of this Note, the term “practice” encompasses the terms “make,” “use,”
“offer for sale,” and “sell.”
29. See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LEGAL, BUSINESS,
AND MARKET DYNAMICS 23, 164-65 (1996).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
31. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, at 240.
32. See id. at 23-30 (discussing factors to be considered when deciding whether to license
or to vertically integrate).
33. Section 261 of the patent statute governs a patentee’s right to assign her patent. It
reads in pertinent part:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable
in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or
legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right
under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified
part of the United States.
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). An assignment is defined as “[t]he act of transferring to another all or
part of one’s property, interest or rights.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990).
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right to exclude others, the license merely acts as a promise by the
patentee not to sue the licensee for practicing the invention.34
Patent licenses may present good business opportunities for both
the patentee-licensor as well as the licensee by allowing both parties
to procure something that they cannot furnish efficiently on their
own.  Patentees-licensors might use patent licenses to obtain much
needed manufacturing and marketing services,35 to break into foreign
markets,36 or to enter domestic markets without making large capital
investments.37 As illustrated by the battle for market dominance be-
tween Apple and IBM, patent licenses may also create a larger de-
mand for the patentee’s invention and in some cases guarantee that
her invention becomes the technical standard in the industry.38 From
a licensee’s perspective, a patent license can allow him to penetrate a
new market without the expense and risk associated with a massive
research and development effort.39 After deciding that it makes good
business sense to license patented technology, the parties must decide
what type of license will help them to achieve their goals efficiently.
34. A license is defined as “permission by competent authority to do an act which, without
such permission, would be . . . otherwise not allowable. . . . Leave to do thing which licensor
could prevent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 919-20.
35. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, at 27; see also NEIL F. SULLIVAN, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: MAKING THE MOST OF YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 91-92 (1995) (discussing
the benefits to be derived from university research organizations licensing their technology to
more adept marketing and production organizations).
36. See GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, A PRIMER ON TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING 3 (1996) (noting that licenses are a good way for domestic companies to break into
international markets by licensing to entities that already possess an expertise in the particular
foreign market).
37. See id. (stating that licensees can allow a company to enter a market “without having
to make a heavy investment in capital equipment and personnel” and thus to “avoid [] many of
the risks” of developing a new product).
38. Unlike Apple, who refused to license their technology, IBM adopted a broad licensing
strategy for its personal computers. See id. at 3-4. Though Bill Gates may disagree, at least one
commentator suspects that IBM’s licensing strategy may be largely responsible for the wide
acceptance of the PC in the marketplace compared with Apple’s lagging Macintosh sales. See
id.; see also Meyer, supra note 2, at 43 (stating that in certain segments of the high technology
industry “patent licenses are often provided on a free or nominal-payment basis in order to
promulgate the patented technology as a de facto industry standard”).
39. See BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 36, at 5; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at
92 (noting that licensing of technology allows a company to channel existing resources towards
the “developmental aspects of the product or planning for the next generation of products”).
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B. Exclusive and Nonexclusive Patent Licenses
The parties can choose one of two general types of patent license
relationships, exclusive or nonexclusive. Under an exclusive patent
license, the patentee promises to continue to exclude all others from
practicing the invention.40 Thus, an exclusive patent license involves
two promises by the patentee: not to sue the licensee for infringe-
ment and not to make that same promise to anyone else. Under a
nonexclusive patent license, the patentee only promises not to sue the
licensee for infringement.41
Whether to pursue an exclusive or a nonexclusive relationship is
a complex decision that determines how much control each party will
have over the patented technology. An exclusive relationship neces-
sarily involves a large shift in control over the patent from the pat-
entee to the licensee. This shift in control may benefit the patentee
by maximizing his royalty rate,42 inducing licensee investments,43 and
promoting economies of scale.44
40. An exclusive license is defined as “[p]ermission to do thing and contract not to give
leave to any one else to do same thing.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 33, at 564.
41. See id. at 919-20.
42. When a patentee grants an exclusive license, she may be seen as transferring her law-
ful monopoly power to her exclusive licensee. This dominant market position often carries a
premium, which may allow the patentee-licensor to maximize his profits by demanding and re-
ceiving higher royalty rates. See Mark David Kleinginna & Lawrence P. Shanda, Making the
Exclusivity Decision, 26 LES NOUVELLES 179, 180 (1991), reprinted in 2 THE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF LICENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1990’S, at 1499, 1501-03 (Jay Simon & Woody
Friedlander eds., 1998) (analyzing the exclusivity decision in licensing intellectual property us-
ing a durable goods paradigm and concluding that an exclusive license permits profit maximiza-
tion).
43. An exclusive license may induce licensee investment by ensuring that the investment
will not benefit other licensees. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, at 70-71. Without an exclusive
license, the licensee may be unwilling to invest in a variety of otherwise profitable activities like
research and development, marketing, and customer services. See id. at 69-70 (noting that re-
search and development investments in nonexclusively licensed technologies may yield unpro-
tectible improvements that can be used by other licensees, that marketing investments may in-
crease market demand for all licensees, and that investment in customer services like repair
services may be used by customers of other licensees).
44. Economies of scale exist when it is cheaper, per unit, to produce a large quantity of a
particular item than it is to produce a small quantity. See DAVID N. HYMAN, ECONOMICS 252-
55 (2d instructor’s ed. 1992). Thus, when economies of scale exist, an exclusive licensee may be
able to minimize production costs because he will be responsible for producing a large quantity
of goods—enough to meet the entire market demand. These lower costs will increase the prof-
itability of the licensee’s exploitation of the patent, see id., and should make the exclusive licen-
see more willing to pay a higher royalty to the licensor-patentee than he would have paid for a
nonexclusive license.
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From the licensee’s perspective, an exclusive license may provide
a dominant market position45 as well as the ability to control the ex-
ploitation and protection of the invention.46 The benefits of an exclu-
sive relationship do not come without costs, however. An exclusive
license forces the patentee-licensor to “plac[e] all [of his] eggs in one
basket,”47 which may not be a good idea for several reasons. Even
though the exclusive licensee has the affirmative duty to maximize
the use of the invention,48 he may fail to exploit the invention, in
which case the patentee has no other licensees available to generate
income.49 The patentee also loses the ability to use his invention for
his own purposes.50 Granting an exclusive license may also subject the
patentee to increased antitrust exposure.51 Finally, an exclusive rela-
45. See Kleinginna & Shanda, supra note 42, at 1502 (noting that by obtaining an exclusive
license, the licensee has the “opportunity to optimize the end-market products’ pricing cycle”
and, as a result, “possibly control the market, in lieu of being controlled by [it]”).
46. See Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (discouraging licensors from issuing exclusive li-
censes because it is “important to have the product available on a nonexclusive basis to the in-
dustry in general”). If a license is nonexclusive, the licensee is not able to control how other
nonexclusive licensees exploit the invention. Additionally, a licensee is not able to sue infring-
ers to protect the invention. See DONALD S. CHISUM, 8 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.03[2][d], at
21-269 (1997) (“[I]t is well-settled that a nonexclusive [patent] licensee has no standing to file
suit for infringement and indeed in most instances is not a proper party to such a suit.”).
47. Kleinginna & Shanda, supra note 42, at 1499.
48. See Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (noting that an exclusive licensee “takes on” this
and other “obligations”).
49. Licensors sometimes avoid this pitfall by placing protective language in the license
agreement that converts the license to a nonexclusive license if the exclusive licensee fails to
meet certain performance criteria. A typical clause might read:
Licensor hereby grants to Licensee, under the Proprietary Rights, an exclusive right
and license to make, have made, use and sell Licensed Products in the Territory.
. . . Licensee shall use its best efforts to market and sell the Licensed Products . . . . If
Licensor determines that Licensee’s marketing efforts with respect to any Licensed
Product . . . are not meeting Licensor’s reasonable commercial expectations, Licen-
sor shall notify Licensee as to what its reasonable commercial expectations are for
marketing and sales of such Licensed Products . . . .
If Licensee advises Licensor that such commercial expectations are not reasonable
and Licensor does not agree with Licensee’s determination, Licensor shall inform Li-
censee in writing within thirty (30) days after receiving Licensee’s explanation that
Licensee shall be deemed to have forfeited its exclusive license rights hereunder and
this license shall become non-exclusive.
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE LICENSING OF BIO-
TECHNOLOGY 155 (1992) [hereinafter WIPO].
50. See Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (noting that General Motors does not use exclusive
licenses because it must maintain the right to use its own inventions).
51. See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, § 3.03[6], at 3-31 (“Exclusive
licenses of patents . . . may be subject to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976.”). The Act requires exclusive intellectual property licenses to be reported if (1) either
party is engaged in activities that affect United States commerce, (2) one party has total assets
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tionship allows the licensee to sue for patent infringement, which can
force the patentee to litigate in inconvenient fora.52 At least one
commentator has indicated that the loss of control over infringement
litigation that accompanies an exclusive license may drive the deci-
sion to pursue a nonexclusive relationship.53 In the end, most patent-
ees conclude that the costs and loss of control over the technology as-
sociated with exclusive licenses outweigh the benefits and opt for a
nonexclusive relationship.54 To fully understand how a nonexclusive
licensee can be adversely affected by his licensor’s bankruptcy and
subsequent rejection of the patent license, it is necessary to examine
why courts deny nonexclusive patent licensees standing to sue for
patent infringement.
C. Nonexclusive Licensees Lack Standing to Sue for Patent
Infringement
Since standing to sue for patent infringement is a statutory right,
understanding nonexclusive licensee standing requires an examina-
tion of the patent statute. Under the statute, a patentee has standing
to bring an action for patent infringement.55 The term “patentee” in-
cludes assignees of the patent.56 While the patent statute appears to
or annual net sales of $100 million or more and the other party has total assets or annual net
sales of $10 million or more, and (3) assets being acquired are valued in excess of $15 million.
See id. at 3-31 to 3-32. But see THE 1995 FEDERAL ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LI-
CENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 94 (1996) (noting that, in general, “an exclusive license
may raise antitrust concerns only if the licensees themselves, or the licensor and its licensees,
are in a horizontal relationship”).
52. See 8 CHISUM, supra note 46, § 21.03[2][c], at 21-264 to 21-265 (“An exclusive licensee
generally has standing to sue for infringement against anyone operating without authority in
the stated area of exclusivity. . . . However, in many instances, the courts will require joinder of
the patent owner as a necessary or indispensable party.”).  The patentee will be deemed to be
an indispensable party to the litigation if he still possesses an interest in the patent. See id. §
21.03[3][b], at 21-284 to 21-285.  Making the patentee an indispensable party protects the in-
fringer against multiple liability.  See id.
53. George Frost noted that:
The exclusive licensee can be expected to want to enforce the patent against his
competitors. If it were possible for him to do this without involving us we would not
be concerned. But this is not possible and any such enforcement is most likely to be-
come litigation involving GM. It would take far greater royalty potential than is usu-
ally available to warrant the risk of being dragged into litigation.
Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665.
54. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 34.
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for in-
fringement of his patent.”).
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1994) (stating that the term patentee “includes not only the
patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee”). Courts
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grant standing to sue for patent infringement only to patentees and
their assignees, courts have interpreted the statute to grant standing
to anyone who possesses any of the proprietary rights granted by the
patent statute.57 These rights consist of the ability “to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the [patented] inven-
tion throughout the United States.”58 Thus, the standing doctrine may
be stated as follows: anyone who possesses the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling a patented invention
has standing to sue for infringement of that patent.
Applying this doctrine, courts have held that exclusive patent li-
censees have standing to sue for infringement provided that they join
the patentee to the action and hold some property rights under the
patent.59 While this appears to open patent standing to a broad class
of potential plaintiffs, courts have limited this effect by requiring the
language in the license to state clearly and unambiguously that the
license is exclusive.60 As a result, many licenses which on their face
appear to be exclusive may be held to be nonexclusive for standing
purposes.
Under the standing doctrine, courts have held that nonexclusive
patent licensees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement,61
which comes as no surprise. Recall that a nonexclusive license is
have interpreted the phrase “successors in title” to include assignees of the patent. See, e.g.,
Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (concluding that a licensee who holds “all substantial rights under the patent” is, in ef-
fect, an assignee and thus has standing to sue for infringement).
57. See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(stating that a licensee who has been given the exclusive right to exploit any or all of the pat-
entee’s proprietary rights has standing to sue for patent infringement).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994).
59. See, e.g., Textile Prods., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 134 F.3d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(noting that an exclusive licensee must join the patentee as co-plaintiff in order to bring a pat-
ent infringement action). Under a limited exception, the exclusive licensee may sue in his own
name if the patentee is infringing his own patent. See id.
60. See William F. Lee et al., When an Exclusive License Is Not an Exclusive License: The
Standing of “Exclusive” Patent Licensees to Sue After Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Genetics
Institute, Inc., 7 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 1, 26 (1997) (noting that after Ortho Pharmaceutical a li-
cense without an explicit promise not to license to subsequent third parties is probably not ex-
clusive). But see Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1484 (stating that an exclusive license may be cre-
ated where a patentee promises “expressly or impliedly” to exclude others from practicing the
invention within the field covered by the license).
61. See Textile Prods., 134 F.3d at 1484 (stating that bare licensees lack standing); Ortho
Pharm., 52 F.3d at 1031 (noting that “a nonexclusive license[e] suffers no legal injury from in-
fringement and, thus, has no standing to bring suit or even join in a suit with the patentee”);
Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 934 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D. Md. 1996)
(stating that a nonexclusive licensee lacks standing).
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merely a promise by the patentee not to sue the licensee for in-
fringement of the patent.62 The license does not allow the nonexclu-
sive licensee to exclude anyone from using the patented technology.
Thus, the patentee has transferred no property interest in the patent
to the nonexclusive licensee. Courts have also stated several policy
reasons for denying standing to nonexclusive licensees. In A.L. Smith
Iron Co. v. Dickson,63 Judge Learned Hand stated the policy reasons
for denying standing as follows:
It is indeed true that a mere licensee may have an interest at stake in
such a suit; his license may be worth much more to him than the
royalties which he has agreed to pay, and its value will ordinarily de-
pend on his ability to suppress the competition of his rivals. The rea-
son why he is not permitted to sue is not because he has nothing to
protect. But against that interest is the interest of the infringer to be
immune from a second suit by the owner of the patent; and also the
interest of the patent owner to be free to choose his forum . . . . In-
deed, the owner may have granted a number of licenses, and it
would be exceedingly oppressive to subject him to the will of all his
licensees. These two interests in combination have been held to
overweigh any interest of the licensee . . . .64
Thus, courts deny standing to nonexclusive patent licensees be-
cause (1) standing requires a property interest that nonexclusive li-
censees lack, (2) standing would subject infringers to multiple liabil-
ity, and (3) standing would deprive the patent owner of the ability to
choose his own forum for the infringement action.
Since patents, and hence patent licenses, derive their value from
the ability to exclude others from utilizing the technology,65 nonexclu-
sive licensees invoke affirmative duties under the license agreements
to ensure that infringers are prosecuted.66  Affirmative duties are ac-
tive, rather than passive, contractual obligations that each party as-
sumes under the license agreement.  Licensees may have affirmative
duties such as informing the patentee-licensor of improvements made
62. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
63. 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1944).
64. Id. at 6; see also Ortho Pharm., 52 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Hand’s language).
65. See Hilboldt, supra note 17, at 201(“[T]he very purpose of a patent is to permit patent
holders and licensees to prevent unauthorized parties from engaging in the patented activity.”).
66. See Joseph Scafetta, Jr., Nonexclusive Patent Licensees: The Lack of Right to Sue for
Patent Infringement, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1976).
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on the invention,67 reporting sales of the licensed invention to the
patentee-licensor,68 or maximizing the use of the invention.69 Simi-
larly, the affirmative duties or obligations of a patentee-licensor may
include furnishing the licensee with improvements to the patented
invention,70 as well as defending the patent against all patent infring-
ers.71 While the patentee-licensor’s affirmative duty to prosecute in-
fringers normally protects the economic interests of nonexclusive li-
censees, this protection can vanish if the patentee-licensor files for
bankruptcy.72
II. TREATMENT OF PATENT LICENSES UNDER SECTION 365(n) OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs corporate
reorganizations,73 balances two competing interests: equitable distri-
bution of the debtor’s property among various creditors, and debtor
rehabilitation.74 By pursuing a policy of debtor rehabilitation, the
Bankruptcy Code provides a way for a company that can pay most of
its debts to stay in business.75 One of the important rehabilitation
powers given to the debtor is the power to assume or reject executory
contracts.76 Executory contracts are generally defined to be contracts
67. See Timothy J. Engling, Improvements in Patent Licensing, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 739, 740-41 (1996), reprinted in 5 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LICENSING: LI-
CENSING IN THE 1990S, supra note 42, at 4265, 4266-67.
68. See Dirk K. Barrett Jr., The Patent License: Standard Clauses and Variations, in
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1995, at 211, 229 (PLI, Patents Series No. 404,
1995).
69. See id. at 236; Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665.
70. See Engling, supra note 67, at 740, reprinted in 5 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF LI-
CENSING: LICENSING IN THE 1990S, supra note 42, at 4265, 4266.
71. See WIPO, supra note 49, at 177 (providing a sample infringement clause from a typi-
cal nonexclusive patent license, which states that “[t]he Licensor shall, at its discretion, use dili-
gence to cause infringement to cease [through] the grant of a license or other remedy or use
diligence in bringing an infringement action against the THIRD PARTY”).
72. See discussion infra Part II.C.
73. See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY 14 (1990).
74. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 18-19 (rev. ed. 1993).
75. See id.
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994) (“[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may as-
sume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”); see also HARVEY M.
LEBOWITZ, BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK 436 (1986). The trustee referred to in the statute is the
bankruptcy trustee who is appointed by the court to perform four basic duties: investigate, liq-
uidate, litigate, and administrate the bankruptcy case. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 106-
07. For the chapter 11 reorganization cases that are the focus of this Note, the debtor typically
acts as his own bankruptcy trustee and is referred to as the “debtor-in-possession.” See id. at
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“under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party
to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other.”77 A debtor will assume an executory
contract, allowing it to remain in effect according to its original
terms, if performance of the contract would benefit his rehabilita-
tion.78 Conversely, a debtor will reject an executory contract if he be-
lieves that continued performance under the contract would be det-
rimental to his rehabilitation.79
While the right to reject promotes debtor rehabilitation, rejec-
tion can have a highly detrimental effect on the other party to the
contract. The Code attempts to protect the interest of the nondebtor
party by allowing him to enter a general unsecured claim for breach
of contract against the debtor.80 Since general unsecured creditors are
108. Throughout this Note, the terms “debtor” and “debtor-in-possession” will be used inter-
changeably.
77. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439,
460 (1973). Despite extensive use of the term, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative
history offers a precise definition of “executory contracts.” See LEBOWITZ, supra note 76, at
437. Although many courts have adopted Countryman’s definition, see, e.g., Mitchell v. Streets
(In re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership), 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989); Gloria Mfg. Corp.
v. International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 734 F.2d 1020, 1021-22 (4th Cir. 1984), at
least two scholars have been critical of his definition as well as the analysis that supports it, see
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U.
COLO. L. REV. 845, 849-51 (1988) (noting that Countryman failed to explain the link between
rejection and “breach”); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Con-
tracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 238 (1989) (stating that when applied too broadly, Countryman’s
definition does not give intuitively correct results); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts
Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8, 9 (1991) (stating that, at
least in the rejection context, Countryman’s definition is of no consequence because whether
the contract is executory or not, the outcome of rejection is the same: it creates a claim against
the estate).
78. See LEBOWITZ, supra note 76, at 436.
79. See id.
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1994). A typical, nonbankrupt company has two types of credi-
tors, secured and unsecured. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 24-27 (2d ed. 1998). Secured creditors have liens on the com-
pany’s assets. See LEBOWITZ, supra note 76, at 17. Conversely, unsecured creditors do not pos-
sess any interest in the company’s assets. See id. at 16. The distinctions between these two kinds
of creditors become important when a company is placed into bankruptcy, which may occur
either voluntarily or involuntarily. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 29-41. Secured creditors
will be paid in full before unsecured creditors receive any payment. See MICHAEL J. HERBERT,
UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY §§ 10.01, .04[A] (1995). All unsecured creditors are not cre-
ated equal, however. Certain unsecured creditors will be repaid before other unsecured credi-
tors. See id. §§ 10.04[A]-[C] (listing the priority of payment for various classes of unsecured
claims and noting that, for example, administrative expenses incurred in the bankruptcy pro-
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typically the last creditors to be paid by the debtor, the nondebtor
party usually recovers little or no money for the breach81 and must
enter the market to find a replacement contract. In cases involving
patent licenses, however, no replacement contract is available in the
market because the debtor-licensor has a lawful monopoly on the
patented technology.82 Despite this fact, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc.83 allowed the debtor-licensor, Richmond Metal Finishers, to re-
ject as executory its nonexclusive patent license agreement with its
licensee, Lubrizol Enterprises.84 The court realized that its holding
could have “a general chilling effect upon the willingness of such par-
ties” to enter into intellectual property licenses, but stated that it felt
bound by the Bankruptcy Code to allow the rejection without con-
cern for the detrimental effects to the nondebtor party.85 The court
noted that Congress had enacted provisions that allowed courts to
consider the plight of real property lessees, who also possess unique
property, but that “no comparable special treatment is provided for
technology licensees such as Lubrizol.”86 In response to the Lubrizol
decision, Congress enacted the IPBPA, which attempted to balance
the competing policies of debtor rehabilitation and innovation ad-
vancement.87
ceeding itself are paid before unsecured tax claims). General unsecured creditors typically will
be paid last. See id. § 10.04[D].
81. See HERBERT, supra note 80, § 4.09 (noting that “only creditors with secured claims
have claims with real value”).
82. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2-4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201-03.
83. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
84. See id. at 1046-48. In 1982, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. entered a nonexclusive license
agreement with Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (RMF) that allowed Lubrizol to use metal
coating process patents owned by RMF. See id. at 1045. RMF filed for bankruptcy roughly one
year later. See id. RMF sought to reorganize and rehabilitate by rejecting the Lubrizol license
as an executory contract under § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code so that it could sell or license
the technology “unhindered by the restrictive provisions in the Lubrizol agreement.” Id.
85. Id. at 1048.
86. Id.
87. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207 (noting that
§ 365(n) “represents a careful compromise between the needs of the debtor and [those of] the
licensee”).
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A. A Summary of the IPBPA
The purpose of enacting the IPBPA88 was to “make clear that the
rights of an intellectual property licensee to use the licensed property
cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of the license
pursuant to Section 365 [of the Bankruptcy Code] in the event of the
licensor’s bankruptcy.”89 This legislation provides the intellectual
property licensee with two options if a court allows a debtor-licensor
to reject a license. The licensee can choose (1) to terminate the li-
cense, in essence acquiescing to the rejection,90 or (2) to retain the li-
cense and to continue making royalty payments.91 Even if the licensee
chooses to retain the license, however, the debtor-licensor still rejects
any affirmative duties that it might have under the license.92 Such af-
88. Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35A),
101(39), 365(n) (1994)).  Section 365(n) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor
of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may elect–
(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection by the
trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat such contract
as terminated by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an
agreement made by the licensee with another entity; or
(B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such
contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to spe-
cific performance of such contract) under such contract, and under any agreement
supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any em-
bodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable non-
bankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced, for-
(i) the duration of such contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the licensee as of right
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) of this
subsection, under such contract–
(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights;
(B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such contract for the du-
ration of such contract and for any period described in paragraph (1)(B) of this sub-
section for which the licensee extends such contract; and
(C) the licensee shall be deemed to waive–
(i) any right to setoff it may have with respect to such contract under this title or ap-
plicable nonbankruptcy law; and
(ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising from the perform-
ance of such contract.
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994).
89. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3200.
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A).
91. See id. § 365(n)(1)(B).
92. See id. (stating that though the licensee may elect to retain his rights, these rights do
not include “any other right[s] under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of
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firmative duties might include the licensor’s obligation to defend the
patent in infringement actions or to continue to improve the technol-
ogy.93 Allowing the debtor-licensor to avoid any affirmative duties
under the license furthers the goal of debtor rehabilitation by
“minimiz[ing] the burdens on the debtor licensor.”94 Still, by choosing
to retain rights under the license, the licensee retains the right to use
the intellectual property as described in the agreement, including
rights under an exclusivity provision.95
Other provisions in the IPBPA address administrative and logis-
tical issues. These issues include the scope of the Act,96 responsibili-
ties of the debtor and the licensee upon retention,97 transfer of intel-
such contract”); S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 9, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206 (stating
that, although the licensee can use the license without interference, he “cannot otherwise com-
pel affirmative post-petition performance under the license”).
93. See Noreen M. Wiggins, Note, The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act:
The Legislative Response to Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 16
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 603, 625 (1990).
94. Mary A. Moy, Comment, The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act: An Un-
balanced Solution to the International Software Licensing Dilemma, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L.
151, 184 n.172 (1989) (noting that “‘[f]uture affirmative actions . . . could deplete the bankrupt
estate at the expense of the general creditors . . . .’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-1012, at 8
(1988))).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (stating that rights retained by licensee “includ[e] a right
to enforce any exclusivity provision” of the license). According to Senator Joseph Biden, the
ability of the licensee to retain exclusive rights to the technology was intended to add “certainty
to licensing transactions.” S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 12, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200,
3209.
96. Under the IPBPA, “‘intellectual property’ means [a] trade secret, invention, process,
design, or plant protected under [the patent statute], patent application, plant variety, work of
authorship protected under [the copyright statute], or mask work.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)
(1994). Trademarks are notably absent from this list. For a criticism of Congress’s omission of
trademarks from the IPBPA, see generally David M. Jenkins, Licenses, Trademarks, and Bank-
ruptcy, Oh My!: Trademark Licensing and the Perils of Licensor Bankruptcy, 25 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 143, 155-75 (1991).
97. If the licensee chooses to retain his right to use the intellectual property, the debtor-
licensor must allow the licensee to exercise these rights and, in return, the licensee must make
all royalty payments due under the license. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2). Section 365(n)(2) also
states that the licensee waives any right to setoff and administrative expenses. See id. Gener-
ally, administrative expenses include all expenses incurred by the estate after the commence-
ment of a bankruptcy. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 234. These expenses may include
attorneys’ or other professionals’ fees. See id. “Setoff” is “the common law right of a creditor to
balance mutual debts with a debtor.” Id. at 189. This common law right is codified in § 553 of
the Bankruptcy Code, with certain limitations. See id. The right of setoff may be beneficial to
the creditor by allowing him to have a priority interest in the money owed to him. See BAIRD,
supra note 74, at 211. However, the limitations imposed by the Bankruptcy Code can lessen the
amount actually received by the creditor, thus most creditors do not request permission to pur-
sue a setoff. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 189-90 (stating that the Code does not allow a
creditor to use as a setoff either “a claim assigned to it by another entity within 90 days of the
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lectual property held by the debtor,98 and trustee actions between pe-
tition filing date and the rejection date.99 While the IPBPA has had its
supporters,100 there has been extensive criticism of the Act.
B. Criticism of the IPBPA
1. Questioning the Need for Congressional Action. Before exam-
ining the specific features of the IPBPA, one must first consider the
threshold issue of whether congressional action was, in fact, needed
to protect intellectual property licensees in the event of licensor
bankruptcy. Some critics believe that Congress overreacted to the re-
sult in Lubrizol by enacting the IPBPA.101 They believe that the
threat from the Lubrizol holding was uncertain and that courts would
have, in time, adopted a balancing test.102 This test, which had already
bankruptcy filing” or “a debt owed to the debtor and incurred within 90 days prior to the fil-
ing”).
98. If requested in writing, the debtor-licensor must transfer intellectual property in its
possession if so provided in the license agreement. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3). This section ad-
dresses the problem faced by most software licensees of determining what happens to the
source code when the licensor enters bankruptcy. See Moy, supra note 94, at 185-86. In a typi-
cal software licensing arrangement, licensees are given a copy of the object code, but not a copy
of the source code. See id. at 160. The object code is all that is required to reproduce the soft-
ware; however, without the source code, the object code is unintelligible and licensees may
have difficulty understanding how the program works. See id. The source code is used for soft-
ware debugging and updating and can be used to misappropriate the program. See id. at 160-61.
Therefore, instead of giving a copy of the source code to the licensee, the licensor performs all
maintenance functions. See id. The source code may be held by the licensor, but it is typically
placed in escrow. See id. at 164. Section 365(n)(3) dictates how the transfer of this type of in-
tellectual property will occur. See id. at 185-86.
99. Upon written request of the licensee, the debtor-licensor must either continue to per-
form under the license or provide the licensee with the intellectual property held by the debtor-
licensor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4).
100. See Hearing on S. 1626, supra note 21, at 224-25 (statement of John L. Pickitt, Presi-
dent, Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association); id. at 235-36 (statement
of Steven C. Mendell, Chief Executive Officer, XOMA Corp.); id. at 242-43 (statement of John
P. McLaughlin, Vice President, Genentech, Inc.); id. at 254-55 (statement of George A. Hahn,
Esq., on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference); id. at 272 (statement of Jeffrey L.
Tarkenton, Esq., on behalf of the American Bankruptcy Institute).
101. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 103 (testimony of George A. Hahn, on behalf of
the National Bankruptcy Conference) (noting that a judicial balancing test would have been
preferable to a congressional response); Moy, supra note 94, at 192 (concluding that a judicial
balancing test would have been more effective than legislative interference in alleviating the
problems created by Lubrizol).
102. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 100 (testimony of George A. Hahn, on behalf of
the National Bankruptcy Conference) (stating that since courts ultimately will adopt a balanc-
ing test, Congress should allow courts to correct the problem); Moy, supra note 94, at 178
(noting that “[g]iven time, the balancing test would have most likely settled the problems that
persisted in cases involving the rejection of . . . technology licensing agreements”).
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been applied by several courts, relied on the bankruptcy court’s equi-
table powers to balance the effects on the debtor’s rehabilitation
against the effects on the licensee’s business to determine if the
debtor could reject the license.103 These critics argue that allowing ju-
dicial resolution of the issue would have resulted in a flexible rule
that might have treated parties more fairly in individual cases than
does subjecting them to a rigid statutory rule that most likely does
not address every potential circumstance.104
While the use of a balancing approach appears to be more fair in
individual cases, it does not provide the predictability that is critical
to contracting parties. It is often better to have a less-than-fair rule
that is predictable than to have a completely fair rule that is unpre-
dictable.105 Parties value predictability over fairness because they can
plan their affairs based on less-than-fair, predictable rules, but not
based on completely fair, unpredictable rules.106 In the case of intel-
lectual property licenses, the balancing approach might be more fair,
but it would inhibit intellectual property licensing. Since the ability to
reject a license would be determined by balancing the equities, the
potential licensor would not be able to predict whether or not he
would be able to reject the license in the event of his bankruptcy.
Likewise, prior to licensor bankruptcy, the potential licensee would
be unable to predict whether or not he could retain the license. This
lack of predictability inherent in a balancing test would inhibit intel-
103. In her Comment, Mary Moy notes that in the pre-Lubrizol decision In re Petur U.S.A.
Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983), the court refused to allow the debtor to
reject an intellectual property license, even though the rejection was based on sound business
judgment, because it would cause a detrimental impact on the licensee that was disproportion-
ate to the benefit gained by the unsecured creditors. See Moy, supra note 94, at 171-72. Moy
also discusses several post-Lubrizol cases that rejected the “harsh” Lubrizol rule and adopted
the balancing test, despite the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Lubrizol. See id. at 174-
77 (discussing In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986), and In re Mid-
west Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986)).
104. See Moy, supra note 94, at 191-92; Hearing on S. 1626, supra note 21, at 292-93
(statement of Thomas M.S. Hemnes).
105. See Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 994 n.37 (5th Cir.
1985) (noting “the supremely important interests in predictability and certainty which lie at the
heart of contract law”); Breskman v. BCB, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting
that “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result . . . are of greatest importance when the
parties are likely to take into consideration the legal consequences of their planned transac-
tions, such as the legal effect of contracts”).
106. See 6A WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §
152:16, at 152-39 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that predictability is important because “[i]f business
people do not know whether their contracts will be enforced, they will not engage in com-
merce”).
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lectual property licenses and continue the chilling effect brought
about by the Lubrizol decision. Moreover, even assuming that the
balancing approach did alleviate the chilling effect, judicial develop-
ment advocates admit that it could have taken several years for this
balancing test to develop organically,107 during which time the chilling
effect of Lubrizol would continue. While it is likely that the IPBPA
does not provide answers for all intellectual property dilemmas faced
in the event of licensor bankruptcy, some legislative action was called
for to provide the predictability that could not have been achieved
through the judicial development of a balancing test.
2. Criticism of IPBPA Provisions. Congress realized that
“intellectual property licensing arrangements are not generally stan-
dardized” and that “the particular transaction is the product of the
circumstances of the licensor, the licensee and other interested par-
ties.”108 Despite this realization, the IPBPA sets out fairly simple rules
to alter the complex relationship between licensor and licensee.
While congressional action was sought by critics of the Lubrizol deci-
sion,109 and arguably by the Lubrizol court itself,110 perhaps no con-
gressional action could have solved all of the myriad problems pre-
sented by the bankrupt licensor’s rejection of an intellectual property
license.111 Critics of the IPBPA have faulted the Act for its limited
107. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 100 (testimony of George A. Hahn on behalf of
the National Bankruptcy Conference) (noting that “there is a general tendency slowly gather-
ing momentum in [the] general direction [of a balancing test], which will take several years”).
108. S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 9 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206.
109. See Jeffrey R. Seul, Comment, License and Franchise Agreements as Executory Con-
tracts: A Proposed Amendment to Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 59 U. COLO. L. REV.
129, 140 (1988) (stating that the judiciary has been “vocal about the need for further reform”).
110. The court noted that Lubrizol had never used the licensed technology, see Lubrizol
Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985), which tends to
indicate that rejection of the license would not have harmed the licensee in the case at hand.
Despite the lack of harm to Lubrizol, the court stated that its decision could have a chilling ef-
fect on technology licensing. See id. at 1048. The court also noted that Congress had decided to
protect other classes of nondebtors, namely lessees of real property and union members under
collective bargaining agreements but, by its silence, had chosen to allow technology licensees to
suffer “the general hazards of § 365.” Id.; see also Seul, supra note 109, at 140-44 (exploring
judicial recognition of the vulnerability of nondebtor parties in the rejection of executory con-
tracts).
111. See Barbara C. Brown et al., Technology Licenses Under Section 365(n) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: The Protections Afforded the Technology User, 95 COM. L.J. 170, 199 (1990)
(“[T]he commercial relationship between technology licensors and licensees is often complex.
It is difficult to construct a Code provision broad enough to cover typical problems, yet one
that will be fair and equitable under all circumstances.”).
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scope,112 for failing to protect the licensor in the event of licensee’s
bankruptcy,113 for failing to adopt a balancing-of-equities approach,114
and for failing to limit the licensor’s ability to assign the license.115
Much of the criticism, however, has focused on the ability of the li-
censor to reject his affirmative obligations.
Criticism of the debtor-licensor’s ability to reject affirmative ob-
ligations has focused on two common obligations: the obligation to
provide ongoing technical support116 and the obligation to share fu-
112. See, e.g., Anthony Giaccio, The Effect of Bankruptcy on the Licensing of Intellectual
Property Rights, 2 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 93, 124-25 (1992) (arguing that the definition of in-
tellectual property under the IPBPA should be expanded to include “all forms of federally pro-
tected intellectual property”); Michael J. Shpizner, Commentary, Congress Passes New Legis-
lation Protecting Licensees of Intellectual Property, 30 IDEA 1, 3-4 (1989) (concluding that one
of the issues left unresolved by the IPBPA was the treatment of trademark licenses). See gener-
ally Jenkins, supra note 96, at 161-75 (discussing the reasons Congress chose to exclude trade-
marks from the definition of intellectual property, the problems resulting from this exclusion,
and proposed amendments to § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code). Congress stated that trade-
marks fell out of the scope of the IPBPA because trademark-licensing relationships depend on
quality control, a complex issue that Congress was not prepared to address at that time. See S.
REP. NO. 100-505, at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
113. See, e.g., Ann Livingston & Leif M. Clark, Technology Transfers: What if the Other
Party Files Bankruptcy?, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 173, 205 (1989).
114. See, e.g., Moy, supra note 94, at 192 (concluding that, by allowing the licensee to retain
the license in every situation, the IPBPA “alleviates the problems of the licensee [while] inad-
vertently creating burdens for the licensor” and recommending that a more balanced approach
be taken that will account for the interest of both the licensee and the licensor); see also John P.
Musone, Comment, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act: A Pro-
posed Solution to Achieve Congress’ Intent, 13 BANKR. DEVS. J. 509, 534 (1997)
(recommending that courts adopt a balancing standard in assessing the right of a licensor to
reject the intellectual property license).
115. See, e.g., Marjorie F. Chertok, Structuring License Agreements with Companies in Fi-
nancial Difficulty–Section 365(n)–Divining Rod or Obstacle Course?, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1045, 1074 (1991) (positing that the failure of § 365(n) to address the assignment issue makes
assumption of the license and subsequent assignment to third parties “the [l]icensor’s [u]ltimate
[w]eapon”). Chertok argues that assignment is the licensor’s ultimate weapon because the li-
censor may assign the license to someone who is incapable of adequately performing under the
contract. See id. at 1075. There are two flaws in this argument. First, if the licensor chooses to
reject the license rather than assume and assign, the licensee is guaranteed of not receiving
adequate performance, since by rejecting, the licensor avoids all affirmative duties. Therefore,
the licensee is no worse off than if the assignee failed to adequately perform. Second, if the as-
signee fails adequately to perform under the terms of the license, the licensee can sue the as-
signee for breach of contract, and actually hope to collect, assuming that the assignee is not also
in bankruptcy. Therefore, assumption and assignment may actually put the licensee in a better
position than rejection. See also David S. Kupetz, Intellectual Property Issues in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 35 IDEA 383, 397 (1995) (noting that § 365(n) is silent as to
the assignment issue and recommending that parties include clauses in the license agreement
limiting the right of assignment to indicate their intent in the event of a bankruptcy).
116. See Brown et al., supra note 111, at 195-96 (noting the inequity of IPBPA’s forcing a
licensee to continue making all royalty payments while a licensor is allowed to reject
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ture improvements.117 Critics argue that a licensee’s interest in intel-
lectual property extends beyond the mere right to use it without the
threat of an infringement suit.118 They contend that allowing the licen-
sor to reject these affirmative obligations diminishes the value of the
intellectual property.119 While critics of the IPBPA have noted that
provisions of the Act may have tipped the scales in favor of either the
licensee or the patentee-licensor, they have all but ignored the fact
that it does not address licensee standing. This aspect of the Act
could nullify any impact its enactment may have had.
“obligations to train the licensee’s personnel, to modify the technology according to changes in
the licensee’s business, and otherwise to support the licensee and service the technology”);
John J. Fry, Note, The Rejection of Executory Contracts Under the Intellectual Property Bank-
ruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621, 641-44 (1989) (discussing how the
IPBPA would not protect a licensee’s right to continued technical consulting services).
117. See Brown et al., supra note 111, at 195 (noting that technology may be licensed at an
early stage of development, with the licensee relying on continued development by the licensor
to make the technology commercially viable). But see Robert T. Canavan, Comment, Unsolved
Mysteries of Section 365(n)–When a Bankrupt Technology Licensor Rejects an Agreement
Granting Rights to Future Improvements, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 800, 813-31 (1991) (arguing,
albeit weakly, that debtor-licensor rejection does not cut off a licensee’s right to future im-
provements because that right is a passive right rather than an affirmative obligation). Canavan
acknowledges that ability to reject rights to future improvements may be attributed to “the
classic ‘fresh start’ [bankruptcy] policy.” Id. at 817. Under this policy, the licensee would be
allowed to use the unburdened future improvements for rehabilitation. See id. Canavan states
that “[t]o date, no commentator has suggested that Congress considered this policy when it en-
acted the [IPBPA], nor was it mentioned in the Senate Report.” Id. He then posits that there is
a “competing policy” of allowing the debtor-licensor only to reject affirmative obligations. Id.
at 818. He argues that given the silence regarding the “fresh start” policy, Congress must have
intended to promote the policy of affirmative obligation avoidance rather than the policy of
debtor rehabilitation. Id. at 816-19. Canavan concludes that since the right to future improve-
ments is not, technically, an affirmative obligation, the IPBPA does not allow the debtor-
licensor to withhold these improvements from the licensee. See id. at 830-31. Canavan’s fatal
flaw is his myopic focus on the IPBPA. The “classic” bankruptcy policy of debtor rehabilitation
was not mentioned in connection with passage of the IPBPA because the IPBPA is merely a
small section in an entire code devoted to debtor rehabilitation. Additionally, the licensor’s
right to reject affirmative obligations is not a “competing” policy; rather it furthers the over-
riding policy of debtor rehabilitation.
118. See, e.g., Fry, supra note 116, at 642 (noting that technical consulting services provided
by the licensor “are largely inseparable from the technology which is the subject of the license
agreement”).
119. See, e.g., id. at 643 (“Without the [technical] expertise of the inventor[-licensor], the
licensee’s ability to commercialize the invention successfully could be significantly impaired
because the inventor[-licensor], with his intimate knowledge of the licensed technology, is in a
much better position to recognize and correct for unforeseen difficulties encountered in its ap-
plication.”); Brown et al., supra note 111, at 195 (“The licensor’s avoidance of [the] obligations
[to provide future improvements] in the early stages of the technology’s development could
effectively deprive the licensee of substantially all of the financial benefits anticipated from the
license.”).
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C. IPBPA’s Failure to Address Licensee Standing Is Its Biggest Flaw
Patents are valuable because they prevent unauthorized parties
from practicing certain technology.120 Thus, the inability to bring an
infringement action makes the patent worthless.121 In criticizing the
IPBPA, commentators have addressed this problem in passing by
discussing how a licensee might be reimbursed if forced to defend the
intellectual property,122 but that discussion bypasses the true issue: the
debtor-licensor’s ability to reject the duty to prosecute infringers
coupled with the nonexclusive licensee’s lack of standing to bring an
infringement action renders the nonexclusive patent license worthless
to the nonexclusive licensee.123
Under nonbankruptcy conditions, the nonexclusive licensee does
not need the ability to sue for patent infringement. Even though he
may base his entire business on the license, the nonexclusive licensee
can protect himself by contractually requiring the patentee-licensor
to defend the patent against infringement.124 The nonexclusive licen-
see has a cause of action for breach of contract should the licensor
fail to prosecute infringers.125 However, if the licensor files for bank-
ruptcy and rejects the nonexclusive patent license as an executory
contract, the nonexclusive licensee is no longer protected. By reject-
ing the license, the debtor-licensor rejects all affirmative duties under
the license, including the duty to defend the patent against infringe-
ment.126 As in the nonbankruptcy setting, the nonexclusive licensee
120. See Hilboldt, supra note 17, at 201.
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Fry, supra note 116, at 641 (“One obligation common to intellectual property
licenses is the licensor’s duty to defend patent infringement suits. Although rejection would
excuse the licensor from defending an infringement suit, the licensee could enter a general, un-
secured claim against the estate for the cost of its defense in the suit under 11 U.S.C. §
502(g).”); Wiggins, supra note 93, at 625 (noting that under the IPBPA, “[t]he licensee cannot
force the licensor to continue to defend him in patent infringement suits” but “[n]o restrictions
are placed . . . on the [licensee’s] right to pursue any general claim for damages . . . under sec-
tion 365(g)”).
123. One article has briefly addressed this issue. See Livingston & Clark, supra note 113, at
195 (“Thus, with respect to [patent] enforcement, the rejecting trustee is excused from bringing
an infringement action. The licensee, who has an incentive to see that such actions are brought,
would appear to lack standing to bring such a suit . . . .”).
124. See Scafetta, supra note 66, at 21 (noting that the licensee is remediless if he fails to
negotiate a clause into the license under which the licensor agrees to enforce the patent). The
license agreement can even provide that the licensee will fund the infringement action if the
patentee is disinclined to incur, or financially incapable of incurring, the legal expenses. See id.
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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has a cause of action for breach of contract.127 This cause of action is
of little value to the licensee, however, because it becomes a general
unsecured claim against the debtor-licensor’s bankruptcy estate.128
General unsecured claims are the last claims to be paid and may be
worth pennies on the dollar at the end of an oftentimes lengthy
case.129 In the meantime, the licensee’s business may be decimated by
ongoing infringement. Because nonexclusive licensees must have
standing to sue for patent infringement to protect themselves in this
situation, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow
nonexclusive licensees to sue for patent infringement if the debtor-
licensor rejects the license.
IV. USE OF THE COMMITTEE MECHANISM TO PROTECT THE PATENT
The IPBPA was enacted to ensure that the debtor-licensor can-
not unilaterally cut off an intellectual property licensee’s right to use
the intellectual property.130 For the IPBPA to fulfill its purpose, a
nonexclusive patent licensee must be able to protect the underlying
patent against infringers following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of the
nonexclusive patent license. To provide this protection, nonexclusive
patent licensees must be given standing to sue for patent infringe-
ment in this limited situation. Thus, what is needed is a mechanism
under the Bankruptcy Code whereby a group of similarly situated
parties can sue in the name of the debtor to protect property of the
debtor’s bankruptcy estate. Such a mechanism, called the creditors’
committee, already exists under the Bankruptcy Code. This Part will
examine how the creditors’ committee can be used to provide stand-
ing to nonexclusive patent licensees.
A. The Committee Mechanism
The Bankruptcy Code uses committees to protect the interests of
creditors while promoting debtor rehabilitation.131 Section 1102 calls
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (1994).
128. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
130. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3200.
131. Since a debtor has the most knowledge of how to run his business, the debtor, acting as
the debtor-in-possession, is typically left in full control of the business during bankruptcy. See
JAMES J. WHITE & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, BANKRUPTCY 172 (2d ed. 1992). While this situa-
tion promotes debtor rehabilitation, the debtor-in-possession may not necessarily protect the
interest of creditors. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 108. The committee mechanism allows
the unsecured creditors to unite and monitor the actions of the debtor-in-possession. See id.
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for the mandatory appointment of a committee composed of unse-
cured creditors, commonly referred to as the Official Creditors’
Committee.132 The creditors’ committee ordinarily consists of the
seven largest unsecured creditors who are representative of the body
of unsecured creditors.133 Additionally, the United States trustee may
appoint other committees at her discretion or, upon request of one of
the parties in interest, by order of the court.134 Congress intended for
additional committees to be appointed in large bankruptcy cases
where the class of unsecured creditors consists of a large number of
creditors with a wide variety of interests and objectives.135 While addi-
tional committees have been used to protect special interests of
groups such as equity shareholders, trade creditors, secured creditors,
and current and former employees,136 bankruptcy courts have been
reluctant to order the appointment of additional committees of unse-
cured creditors.137 This reluctance stems from the belief that multiple
committees may complicate negotiations between the debtor and
creditors, delay the debtor’s reorganization process, and create addi-
tional administrative expenses for the debtor’s estate.138
To aid committees in protecting the interests of creditors, the
Code grants them broad powers. Committees have the power to
monitor the actions or inaction of the debtor,139 to aid in formulating
a plan of reorganization,140 and to “perform such other services as are
in the interest of those represented.”141 Additionally, with the court’s
approval, committees may hire their own attorneys and account-
ants,142 whose expenses are payable by the debtor’s estate.143 Commit-
132. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (“[T]he United States trustee shall appoint a committee of
creditors holding unsecured claims . . . .”). Since the unsecured creditors’ committee is the only
committee whose appointment is mandated by the Code, it is commonly referred to as the Of-
ficial Creditors’ Committee or the Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee. See
BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 108. It should be noted that if the debtor is a small business,
the court “may order that a committee of creditors not be appointed.” 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3).
133. See Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 44 S.C. L. REV. 995, 1005 (1993) (explaining § 1102(b)(1)).
134. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102(a)(1)-(2).
135. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 114 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5900.
136. See Klee & Shaffer, supra note 133, at 1027-30.
137. See id. at 1025.
138. See id. at 1024-25 (noting that the common assumption is that all additional commit-
tees appear to enjoy the same rights as the Official Creditors’ Committee).
139. See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2).
140. See id. §§ 1103(c)(2)-(3).
141. Id. § 1103(c)(5).
142. See id. § 1103(a).
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tees also have a general right to “raise and [to] appear and be heard
on any issue in a case under [chapter 11].”144 While the Code grants
broad powers to committees, it does not expressly grant committees
the power to bring adversary proceedings in the name of the
debtor.145 Realizing that standing provides an important form of
creditor protection,146 however, a majority of courts consider commit-
tee standing to sue on behalf of the debtor to be implicitly included
among the broad general powers granted to committees.147
Courts have limited their willingness to grant committee stand-
ing to avoid unnecessarily wresting power from the debtor. Before
granting standing to sue on the debtor’s behalf, courts typically re-
quire the creditors’ committee to show that “(1) a colorable claim
exists that the debtor has not pursued, (2) the committee made a de-
mand upon the debtor to bring the action, and (3) the debtor unjusti-
fiably refused to pursue the action following the demand.”148 To pro-
tect the debtor’s right to administer his bankruptcy estate, the
creditors’ committee must demonstrate these elements even if the
committee members fully fund the litigation.149 While courts usually
grant standing to allow creditors’ committees to pursue debtor claims
arising under the bankruptcy statute,150 courts also have granted
143. See id. § 503(b)(4).
144. Id. § 1109(b).
145. See Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. Monsour Med. Ctr. (In re Monsour Med.
Ctr.), 5 B.R. 715, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980).
146. See id.
147. See Peter C. Blain & Diane Harrison O’Gawa, Creditors’ Committees Under Chapter
11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code: Creation, Composition, Powers, and Duties, 73 MARQ.
L. REV. 581, 606 (1990) (noting that courts have implied creditor standing under § 1103(c)(5)
or § 1109(b) of the Code).
148. Klee & Shaffer, supra note 133, at 1044.
149. See id. at 1044-45.
150. Courts usually grant standing to committees so that they may enforce the debtor’s
rights under the Bankruptcy Code to avoid fraudulent and preferential transfers. See id. at
1044. Under § 548, governing fraudulent transfers, the debtor can recover money transferred
by the debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)
(1994). See generally BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 183-85 (discussing fraudulent transfers).
Section 547 allows the debtor to recover money preferentially given to certain creditors within
90 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition so that the money may be distributed
among all creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). See generally BUCHBINDER, supra note 73,
at 169-81 (discussing preferences). The debtor may choose not to pursue these claims for sev-
eral reasons. The debtor may lack sufficient funds to bring the action himself. See HERBERT,
supra note 80, § 14.05. Additionally, the transfer could have been made to one of the debtor’s
executives, resulting in a potential conflict of interest because the person making the decision
to recover the money may be the very person from whom the money will be recovered. See id.;
Michael L. Cook et al., Fraudulent Transfers, in 20TH ANNUAL CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
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standing to committees so that they may pursue debtor claims arising
under other statutes.
Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co.151 involved
a contractor creditors’ committee, appointed by a bankruptcy court
under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a), that had filed a complaint under Louisiana
law against the officers and directors of the debtor, Louisiana World
Exposition, for gross negligence, mismanagement and breach of fidu-
ciary duty.152 A bankruptcy court had granted standing to the contrac-
tor creditors’ committee to sue on behalf and in the name of the
debtor.153 The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, noting that under Louisiana law, corporate
creditors do not have standing to maintain such an action; therefore,
the creditors’ committee should not have standing.154 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that under the state statute only a
corporation or its shareholders had a cause of action and that a credi-
tor has no such cause of action.155 In spite of this fact, the court held
that the contractor creditors’ committee had standing to bring the
suit against the directors because the committee was bringing the ac-
tion on behalf of and in the name of the debtor, who did have stand-
ing to sue under the state statute.156
The contractors in Louisiana World Exposition and nonexclusive
patent licensees are in similar situations. The members of the con-
tractor creditors’ committee ordinarily would have lacked standing to
sue for gross negligence, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary
duty.157 Similarly, nonexclusive patent licensees ordinarily lack
standing to sue for patent infringement. Despite the contractor credi-
tors’ committee’s lack of standing, the court allowed the committee
to bring suit under the Louisiana statute on behalf and in the name of
the debtor.158 Similarly, nonexclusive patent licensees who are mem-
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1998, at 415, 437 (PLI Commercial Law Series No. 767,
1998) (discussing adversary proceedings in the fraudulent transfer context).
151. 858 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988).
152. See id. at 235.
153. See id. at 234.
154. See id. at 234-35.
155. See id. at 239-40 (noting that “[i]t is clear . . . beyond peradventure that Louisiana law
does not give a creditor a direct cause of action against a director of an insolvent corporation
for damages for gross negligence, mismanagement or breach of fiduciary duty”).
156. See id. at 252.
157. See id. at 239-40.
158. See id. at 247.
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bers of a creditors’ committee should have standing to sue for patent
infringement on behalf of and in the name of the patentee.
B. Patent Licensee Creditors’ Committees
1. Nonexclusive Licensees May Have Standing to Sue. Nonexclu-
sive patent licensees who are parties to licenses that have been re-
jected in bankruptcy currently have two options for obtaining stand-
ing to sue for patent infringement: the Official Creditors’ Committee
or a patent licensee creditors’ committee. As discussed earlier, when
a patentee-licensor rejects a patent license, the licensee becomes a
general unsecured creditor of the debtor.159 As a result, the licensee’s
interests are protected by the Official Creditors’ Committee.160 Thus,
the nonexclusive patent licensee could get the Official Creditors’
Committee to pursue a patent infringement action on behalf of and in
the name of the patentee. This result is unlikely, however, because
the nonexclusive licensee’s breach of contract claim is probably not
large enough to place the licensee on the Official Creditors’ Commit-
tee, which is comprised of the seven largest unsecured creditors.161
Alternatively, like the contractors in Louisiana World Exposi-
tion, the nonexclusive licensees could ask the court to appoint an ad-
ditional creditors’ committee,162 a patent licensee creditors’ commit-
tee, to protect the special interest of patent licensees.163 While
bankruptcy courts may be sensitive to the needs of patent licensees,
there is no guarantee that courts will appoint such a committee. In
fact, bankruptcy courts generally have been reluctant to order the
appointment of additional committees.164 As with the balancing test
proposed as an alternative to the IPBPA,165 this solution is unsatisfac-
tory because it is unpredictable. A more permanent solution is
needed.
2. Congress Should Require the Formation of a Patent Licensees’
Creditors’ Committee. Section 365(n) should be amended to provide
that upon debtor-licensor rejection of a patent license, bankruptcy
159. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 132-33 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
162. See Louisiana World Exposition, 858 F.2d at 235.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
164. See Klee & Shaffer, supra note 133, at 1025.
165. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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courts will form a patent licensees’ creditors’ committee to protect
the patent during the bankruptcy proceeding.166 All licensees of the
patent, exclusive and nonexclusive, would be eligible for committee
membership. Participation on the committee would be voluntary, but
the patentee and all licensees of the patent would be bound by the ac-
tions of the committee.167
The committee would have standing to bring patent infringe-
ment actions under the patent statute on behalf of and in the name of
the debtor-patentee. Since the action would be on behalf of the pat-
entee, any damages recovered would become part of the debtor’s es-
tate after reimbursing the licensee committee for litigation costs. As
with other creditors’ committees, before a court would grant stand-
ing, the patent licensee creditors’ committee would have to show that
(1) a colorable claim of infringement exists that the debtor-licensor
has not pursued, (2) the committee made a demand on the debtor to
bring the action, and (3) the debtor unjustifiably refused to pursue
the action following the demand.168 Refusal based on a lack of finan-
cial resources to pursue the action would be deemed unjustifiable if
the moving member of the committee is prepared to fund the litiga-
tion. The decision to attempt to pursue an infringement action would
be an individual one, not a majoritarian one. Thus, standing would be
granted to any member who could demonstrate the existence of the
three elements listed above. To ensure that the licensee committee
furthers the pursuit of debtor rehabilitation, any costs incurred by the
committee would be borne by the committee members who have
chosen to pursue the infringement action rather than by the bank-
ruptcy estate. However, committee members may be reimbursed out
of any funds recovered in the litigation.
The committee mechanism adequately addresses each of the
three reasons courts have given for denying standing to nonexclusive
licensees: lack of property interest, subjecting infringers to multiple
liability, and depriving patentee choice of forum. First, since the pat-
ent licensee creditors’ committee would bring the infringement action
in the name of and on behalf of the patentee, the committee would
possess a property interest in the patent. Second, the committee
166. Providing a mechanism to protect the patent only makes sense; it is in the best interest
of the estate to protect all assets of the estate, and the patent is an asset of the estate.
167. Allowing membership on the committee to be voluntary would relieve smaller licen-
sees of the burden of participating in the committee if they feel that they are not likely to need
to pursue an infringement action.
168. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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mechanism solves the problem of multiple liability because it would
effectively create a mandatory class action comprised of all interested
potential plaintiffs to prosecute the infringement action. Since the li-
censees’ committee would be pursuing the infringement action on
behalf of the patentee, the patentee would be bound by the outcome
of the case. Similarly, all other licensees would be bound by the out-
come based on their membership on the committee and their oppor-
tunity to assist in pursuing the action.
Finally, use of the committee mechanism overcomes the criti-
cism that nonexclusive licensee standing hinders the patentee’s
privilege to choose a convenient forum in two ways. Prior to being
granted standing to sue, the licensees’ committee must have made a
demand on the debtor-patentee to pursue the action which was re-
fused by the debtor-patentee. This safeguard gives the debtor-
patentee the opportunity to choose his forum by choosing to pursue
the infringement action. If the debtor-patentee refuses the demand,
he can be deemed to have waived his privilege to choose his forum.
Moreover, once the committee is granted standing, it can bring an ac-
tion in place of the patentee. By not requiring the committee to join
the debtor-patentee in the infringement action, the debtor-patentee
is spared litigation in an inconvenient forum.
Use of the committee mechanism would continue § 365(n)’s cur-
rent policy of relieving the debtor-licensor of the affirmative duty to
prosecute infringing parties, thus promoting debtor rehabilitation.
The committee mechanism would also allow the patent licensees to
protect their interest in the patent without subjecting the infringing
party to multiple liability.
CONCLUSION
Currently, § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtor-
licensors to reject patent licenses as executory contracts and, in the
process, to reject the affirmative duty to protect the patent against in-
fringement. As written, the statute allows patent licensees to con-
tinue using the license while providing for debtor rehabilitation.
However, Congress did not consider that nonexclusive patent licen-
sees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement.
Section 365(n) should be amended to provide for the formation
of a patent licensee creditors’ committee upon the rejection of a pat-
ent license. The committee would balance the interests of the patent
licensees with the goal of debtor rehabilitation by providing a
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mechanism to protect the patent against infringement for the dura-
tion of the debtor’s bankruptcy while relieving the debtor-licensor
from the burden of funding patent litigation.
